

## California Stage 3 Emergency Update

### August 1, 2000

The California ISO notified BPA late Wednesday afternoon, July 26, that they expected to enter a stage 3 emergency on the afternoons of July 31 and August 1, due to the hot weather. (Stage 3 emergency equates to an interruption in firm load via rolling black outs.) California anticipates being approximately 1000 Mws short for 3-4 hours each day. BPA has committed to declare a system emergency under the BiOp if necessary to aid California. This could mean interrupting fishery operations. BPA began taking preliminary actions to lessen the event such as preparing a regional plea for energy conservation, negotiating with industrial users for possible voluntary load curtailments, rescheduling planned unit outages, insuring sufficient inflow to GCL via NTS releases, reshaping Willamette generation, etc.

On Thursday, BPA notified FPAC members of the potential emergency situation and asked for their help in developing operating criteria for suspending fishery operations in the event it became necessary.

On Friday afternoon about 2:00 p.m. an explosion erupted in the left powerhouse at Grand Coulee Dam, taking the entire powerhouse, including the station service generators out of service (approx. 1100 Mws). On Saturday, the right powerhouse went out of service while they surveyed it for damage related to the fire. The right powerhouse was restored to service throughout the day on Sunday. In addition to severely damaging the 6.9 kv station service system the fire appears to have damaged control wiring which will require an unknown amount of time to replace. A design team from Denver, CO arrived at the project Monday morning to begin developing repair/ replacement strategy. The project changes are being minimized until further notice. This outage also eliminates the use of pumps 1-6. P/G 7-9 are not available due to a failed transformer, therefore units 10 – 12 will need to operate around the clock and even then will not be able to sustain the elevation at Banks Lake within its operating range.

With the uncertainty in GCL's availability for Monday, BPA began taking actions over the week-end of July 29/30 to position the system to meet **regional** loads for Monday. These actions included moving additional water to the Lower River projects and filling above MOP at Lower Granite and securing DSI curtailments. (75 Mws for Monday and 120 Mws for Tuesday with the option for an additional 40 Mws on Tuesday during the hours of 4 p.m. – 7 p.m. both days.) BPA coordinated these actions with the COE and NMFS on Saturday evening.

On Monday morning, an emergency TMT meeting was called to update TMT members on the status of the expected emergency and to finalize a list of actions that could be taken to increase Columbia River generation.

Temperatures in California on Monday did not reach forecast levels, such that the California ISO reached only a stage 2 emergency level (voluntary curtailment).

Tuesday however was another matter, California called an imminent Stage 3 emergency situation at 4p.m.. BPA increased generation up to the intertie line capacity. Additional emergency actions included increasing generation at Albeni Falls and Hungry Horse Dams and delaying the start of nighttime spill at John Day Dam by one hour. (Hungry Horse generation was increased ahead of reducing spill on the lower Columbia River due to its extended ramp up time.) We anticipated moving further through the list, however the intertie capacity limit was reached sooner than expected. With our increased generation, California was able to avoid rolling blackouts.

We expect similar conditions in California throughout the remainder of this week.

**Revised List as of 12:45 p.m. based on TMT input**  
**Prioritized List of FCRPS Operations Which May Be Used During a NW or**  
**SW System Reliability Event**  
**Final 7/31/00**

1. Regional plea for energy conservation
2. Voluntary load curtailment of industrial users
3. Rescheduling of unit outages
4. Increase Willamette Projects' generation
5. Purchase all available energy
6. Maximize Treaty/Non Treaty water releases
7. JDA – increase operating range to 265 ft. to 262.5 ft.
8. ψGCL – draft at 1.5 ft/day (or until restricted by JDA cutplane)
9. LWG – utilize full operating pool
10. ALF – operate at full power to elevation 2062 ft. (mindful of ramp rates) USFWS has no problem with this operation
11. TDA – reduce spill to 30%
12. TDA – reduce spill to 20%
13. BON – reduce daytime spill to 50 kcfs
14. JDA – reduce daytime spill to zero (JDA is expected to be at zero 7/31-8/3)
15. MCN – operate outside 1% operating efficiency at 50% overload (approx. 72 Mws)
16. HGH – operate all available units (bring up to 3 units until further notice)
17. \*JDA – reduce spill to zero (nighttime)
18. \*TDA – reduce spill to zero
19. \*IHR – reduce spill to zero
20. \*BON – reduce spill to zero
21. BON – operate outside of 1% operating efficiency
22. MCN - operate outside 1% operating efficiency at 100% overload (approx. 81 Mws)
23. ψBanks Lake – operate PGs / sag on Banks Lake to elevation 1565 ft.
24. ♦ψGCL – increase to 2 ft/day draft
25. ♦Snake River Projects – go to zero nighttime flow (lower Snake projects may go above MOP)
26. ♦DWR – increase discharge to 21 kcfs
27. ♦LIB – operate all available units (maintain minimum flow of 7 kcfs at night)
28. ♦JDA – increase operating pool range to a low of 260 ft.
29. ♦MCN – pull fish screens

The above list has been coordinated with the TMT.

- ψ Due to a fire at GCL 2<sup>nd</sup> powerhouse on 7/28/00, GCL is currently being base loaded and is not in a position at this time to respond as shown on the list above. This also impacts the operation of Banks Lake.
- \* Items 17-20 may be utilized for up to six hours at a time. Judi Johansen will coordinate with the General Strock if additional hours are required.
- ♦ Items 24–29 will required additional coordination between Judi Johansen and General Strock and Mr. McDonald before being implemented.